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The last decade has seen a growth of new 
approaches in contract theory that go beyond 
the traditional models of complete and incom-
plete contracting to incorporate some of the 
most prominent psychological biases when 
modeling the behavior of contracting partners. 
Many of the traditional contracting models have 
been expanded to incorporate behavioral dimen-
sions such as loss aversion, time inconsistency, 
or over-optimism, which allows researchers to 
more realistically explain the observed contract-
ing behavior in the economy.1
The property rights and incomplete contract-
ing literature has only very recently started to 
embrace these new extensions. One of the central 
building blocks of incomplete contracting theo-
ries is the assumption that parties to a contract 
will always engage in ex post efficient renego-
tiation in the case of (un)foreseen shocks (Hart 
and Moore 1988, 1990). As long as the valua-
tion of the good is higher for the buyer than the 
seller, mutually beneficial trade should occur. 
However, the risk that contracting partners will 
extract surplus in renegotiations (hold up) leads 
to underinvestment ex ante, especially when 
investments are relationship-specific. While 
these models have been very influential, several 
recent theories have raised doubts about whether 
it is a reasonable assumption that ex post rene-
gotiation will always reach efficient outcomes. 
Hart and Moore (2008) and Hart (2009) argue 
that contracts act as a reference point for the 
feelings of entitlement of contracting parties. 
They show that rigid contracts (fixed price) 
work well in normal times. However, when a 
1 See Koszegi (2014) for an excellent overview of these 
new theories. 
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bad shock occurs and renegotiation becomes 
necessary, the side that has to move away from 
the anticipated best outcome will ex post feel 
aggrieved. The aggrieved party will engage in an 
action that hurts the other side, which is impos-
sible to prevent contractually. As a result, rather 
than negotiating, parties might in some cases 
just not engage in trade. Herweg and Schmidt (2012) take a somewhat different approach and 
propose that buyers and sellers are loss-averse, 
and the contract serves as a reference point for 
the ex post outcomes. Since a party evaluates a 
worse-than-contracted term (e.g., a drop in price 
for the seller) as a loss, parties are reluctant to 
compromise and renegotiate contracts optimally 
due to loss aversion.
These frictions in (re)negotiation might affect 
the allocative efficiency of contracts, distort mar-
ket clearing prices, and account for some part of 
the price rigidities that have been found in prod-
uct markets. For example, Kahneman Knetsch, 
and Thaler (1986) conduct surveys and find that 
individuals consider it unfair for firms to exploit 
shifts in demand by raising prices.2 This might 
in turn lead to price stickiness, especially on the 
upside, since sellers do not want to be seen as 
price gouging.
Despite the importance of examining how 
contracting parties renegotiate contracts in the 
face of shocks, the empirical evidence is lim-
ited. To test these theories and understand real 
contracting outcomes, we developed a new audit 
technology where we engage in actual transac-
tion with contracting partners. This approach 
allows us to control dimensions of the deal and 
the contract that are usually unobservable, such 
as the specificity of the contract, the bargaining 
power of the parties, or even the characteristics 
of the people who are matched in a contracting 
situation. More importantly, we can  randomize 
2 See also Banerjee and Duflo (2000); Blinder et al. 
(1998); Fehr and Schmidt (1999); and Rotemberg (2005) 
for a discussion on importance of implicit contracts between 
firms and their customers. 
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along these dimensions in order to provide 
robust tests.
This is an important innovation since the 
empirical evidence in this area has been ham-
pered by the use of secondary data that does not 
lend itself easily to this analysis. One is con-
cerned about endogenous matching of contract 
partners on unobservable dimensions and selec-
tion bias since only transactions that get com-
pleted are in the data.3
In a series of papers, Iyer and Schoar (2012 
and 2014) document the two sides of the hold 
up problem: we first investigate to what extent 
transacting parties are willing to engage in hold 
up when given the opportunity. Second, we test 
how parties respond when faced with the threat 
of hold up. This second dimension allows us to 
see if businesses fear being held up by their cus-
tomers. In both cases we find very interesting 
dynamics: Outright hold up appears to be rela-
tively rare and seems usually mitigated by fear 
of reputation costs and social norms against such 
price gouging. However, while contracting par-
ties do not engage in hold up, we also find that 
the reluctance to engage in renegotiation some-
times leads to inefficiencies. That is, due to the 
fear of being seen as holding up the buyer, the 
seller does not initiate a renegotiation (foregoes 
efficient renegotiation), leading to a breakdown 
of trade. Below, we briefly describe the experi-
ments we run to examine renegotiation among 
contracting parties.
In the first experiment, Iyer and Schoar (2014), we use the setting of the tailoring 
industry in India to examine whether there is a 
breakdown of trade due to inefficiencies in rene-
gotiation. Auditors act as customers and place 
an order for a garment to be tailored. A useful 
feature of the tailoring market is that once the 
order has been placed, most of the bargaining 
power is with the tailor, since they can hold on 
to the cloth. To induce the need for (re) negoti-
ation, we have different treatments that vary in 
the type of urgency. The auditors either convey 
upfront that they have an urgent need for the 
garment to be stitched within one day (upfront 
urgency) or alternatively, the auditor initially 
places a normal order but then returns to the 
3 There is also a growing experimental literature that 
studies contracting and bargaining in laboratory settings 
(see, for example, Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder 2009 and 2011; 
Hoppe and Schmitz 2011; Bartling and Schmidt 2014). 
store the same day to ask for expedited stitching 
within one day due to an unforeseen emergency (in-between urgency). Introducing urgency 
affects the tailors in two ways; first, the costs to 
meet the urgency are higher (both in the upfront 
and in-between urgency), as tailors have to rear-
range their schedules or have their employees 
work overtime to fill the request. Second, in the 
treatment with in-between urgency, the bargain-
ing power of the tailor is higher because she has 
the cloth for the order and could refuse to return 
it (claiming that it has already been cut).
We find that tailors in general do not initiate a 
renegotiation to extract surplus even though they 
have higher bargaining power in the in-between 
case. Tailors either agree to fulfill the order 
with no price increase or refuse the order alto-
gether. However, interestingly, (in another set 
of treatments) when auditors initiate a renego-
tiation and offer a higher price in case the tailor 
refuses the urgent order, we find that tailors are 
willing to accept the urgent order. Thus, tailors 
refuse to meet the urgent order unless the audi-
tor proposes a higher price. We find that results 
cannot be explained by capacity constraints ( high-reservation value) of  tailors or low-res-
ervation value of the urgency for customers. 
In fact, when we partner with tailors to under-
stand the behavior of actual customers, we find 
that customers in the marketplace who have an 
urgency do not offer additional money them-
selves. However, when the tailor demands addi-
tional money for the urgency, customers agree 
to pay but they complain about having to pay 
extra. Thus, even though they agree to pay the 
additional money for the urgent order, customers 
feel “aggrieved.” The results suggest that tailors 
often do not ex post efficient renegotiate and they 
would rather allow trade to break down than to 
be seen as taking advantage of their customers. 
This suggests that the tailors perceive the cost of 
aggrieving one’s customers as very high.
In a second step, we investigate the other side 
of the contract relationship to examine whether 
sellers in an economy like India expect buyers to 
engage in hold up behavior. Or whether there are 
mitigating forces, such as reputation or social 
norms that support an equilibrium with low lev-
els of hold up. To examine this question, Iyer 
and Schoar (2012) conduct a second experiment 
in the market for pens and stationary goods in 
Chennai. The main idea behind the experiment 
is to examine how contracts are structured in a 
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setting where enforcement of contracts is weak 
and the seller has to make relationship-specific 
investments.
We again used trained auditors who mimic 
average shoppers in the market to negotiate 
and execute real transactions for bulk pen pur-
chases with wholesalers. But in contrast to the 
prior experiment, this time the seller is exposed 
to the risk of hold up from the customers, since 
the seller is asked to make upfront a relation-
ship-specific investment. To exogenously vary 
the level of relationship-specific investments 
wholesalers are required to make, we randomly 
assign two different types of pens to be ordered. 
Half of the orders are for generic pens (“plain 
pens”), which are easy to resell in the market. 
The other half are orders for customized pens (“printed pens”) where the wholesaler is asked 
to print a specific logo on the pens. Printed pens 
require a greater relationship-specific invest-
ment from the wholesaler, since once the pens 
are procured and printed, their outside value is 
essentially zero. Therefore the wholesaler faces 
the risk that once the printing is done, the shop-
per might not pick up the goods (breach risk). A 
related risk is that the shopper might return but 
try to renegotiate a lower price ex post after the 
wholesaler has already printed the pens.
Interestingly, we find that wholesalers use 
simple contract provisions to mitigate these 
risks, in particular, upfront payments. However, 
the absolute level of the upfront payment that 
wholesalers demand for printed pens is rela-
tively low. On average, the upfront payment 
only covers about 40 percent of the production 
costs, which exposes wholesalers to a large loss 
if the shopper tries to renegotiate the contract ex 
post or breaches it altogether. At the same time, 
wholesalers do not charge a higher price (i.e., a 
price premium) for the printed pen orders com-
pared to the generic pens. The results suggest 
that upfront payments are used as a mechanism 
to screen customers who are likely to breach 
the contract. However, wholesalers are not con-
cerned about renegotiation.
Finally, we also try to renegotiate the contract 
and demand a lower price once the printing is 
done. We find that wholesalers are willing to 
renegotiate at a significantly higher frequency 
for printed pens. However, in a substantial num-
ber of cases we find that wholesalers refuse to 
renegotiate and are willing to take a loss on the 
order of printed pens. This again suggests that 
the average prevalence of renegotiation in the 
marketplace must be low; otherwise, the whole-
salers will not be able to break even.
While both breach and hold up have negative 
consequences for the seller, customers seem 
more willing to engage in breach even when 
they are bound by social norms and reputation 
concerns not to renegotiate. What can explain 
this type of differential behavior? The difference 
seems to be that one constitutes a sin of omis-
sion rather than commission. We conjecture that 
reputation concerns and social norms are not 
as effective in preventing contract breach due 
to the lack of social context when a customer 
does not return. In contrast, deliberately hold-
ing up the counterparty is more easily observ-
able as a strategic action and, as such, seems 
to be morally less acceptable (or socially more 
uncomfortable).
Overall, the results suggest that contracting 
parties in general are reluctant to engage in hold 
up. But the flip side of the result is that many 
efficient renegotiations of contracts also do not 
happen for the fear of being seen as extracting 
surplus. These results suggest that frictions in 
renegotiation can have real consequences for 
allocative efficiency of contracts. The results 
also highlight that while norms of fairness and 
reputation concerns could help sustain transac-
tions in settings where contracts are primarily 
incomplete (for example, in countries with weak 
legal enforcement), these mechanisms could 
also lead to distortions due to reluctance by con-
tracting parties to engage in efficient renegotia-
tion due to reputation concerns.4
The results so far suggest that there can be ex 
post inefficient breakdown of trade. However, 
there are still many open questions. While the 
results suggest that there are ex post distortions, 
this equilibrium could be efficient from an ex 
ante perspective. For instance, if customers know 
that they will not be taken advantage of, it could 
ensure much bigger participation in the market 
ex ante even for people who are not familiar 
with the pricing or renegotiating standards. A lot 
more research has to be done to map out the full 
extent of how social norms,  behavioral biases, 
and reputation concerns affect the behavior of 
contracting parties in real markets.
4 See Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, 2006) for the 
role of social capital in financial development. 
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